Performing Hybridity or Deflecting Islamophobia? Adaptable Identity Management amongst Young British Pakistani Muslims by Khan, Fatima & Mythen, Gabe
Khan, Fatima and Mythen, Gabe (2021) Performing Hybridity or Deflecting
Islamophobia? Adaptable Identity Management amongst Young British Pak-





Usage rights: Creative Commons: Attribution 4.0






Performing Hybridity or Deflecting Islamophobia?
Adaptable Identity Management amongst Young British
Pakistani Muslims
Fatima Khan 1,* and Gabe Mythen 2


Citation: Khan, Fatima, and Gabe
Mythen. 2021. Performing Hybridity
or Deflecting Islamophobia?
Adaptable Identity Management
amongst Young British Pakistani
Muslims. Social Sciences 10: 449.
https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci
10120449
Academic Editor: Nigel Parton
Received: 15 September 2021
Accepted: 17 November 2021
Published: 24 November 2021
Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neutral
with regard to jurisdictional claims in
published maps and institutional affil-
iations.
Copyright: © 2021 by the authors.
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.
This article is an open access article
distributed under the terms and
conditions of the Creative Commons
Attribution (CC BY) license (https://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/
4.0/).
1 Department of Sociology, Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester M15 6BH, UK
2 Department of Sociology, Social Policy and Criminology, University of Liverpool, Liverpool L69 3BX, UK;
g.mythen@liv.ac.uk
* Correspondence: f.khan@mmu.ac.uk
Abstract: This article engages with issues of identity construction and maintenance as expressed by a
group of young British Pakistanis living in the North-West of England. Drawing on primary data
from a qualitative study, we examine the ways in which Muslim identities are maintained, negotiated,
and protected in relation to everyday situated cultural experiences. Nested within a context in which
Islamophobia is pervasive, we discuss four salient processes of identity management articulated
by participants: cherry picking; strategic adaption; ambassadorship and active resistance. Whilst
these processes are to be considered as porous rather than mutually exclusive, our analysis elucidates
evidence of both nimble and creative individual identity management and also an entrenchment of
collective pride. We posit that, for the participants in this study, such practices constitute a grounded,
pragmatic response to living in an environment in which their religious beliefs, political values and
cultural commitments are frequently questioned within public life, the media and the political sphere.
Keywords: agency; hybridity; identity; Islamophobia; resistance; young Muslims
1. Introduction
Presenting data from an empirical study conducted in the North-West of England,
this article focuses on the diverse ways in which young British Pakistani Muslims con-
ceive, maintain and negotiate their identities. We begin by discussing the underlying
factors which have fostered a cultural climate of suspicion towards Muslims in Britain,
highlighting the catalytic role of longstanding media and political discourses in rendering
Islam as ‘other’ and Muslims as ‘risky’. We go on to consider the sociostructural factors
which have, in various ways, influenced the lives of participants, before delineating our
methodological approach. Our key findings are presented with recourse to four salient pro-
cesses emergent during data analysis. First, we discuss practices of cherry picking, through
which individuals selectively adopt and deploy particular cultural products and artefacts
to configure multi-faceted hybridic identities. Second, we elucidate examples of strategic
adaption, a form of impression management which permits the contextual modification
of display and behaviour. Third, we illuminate the process of ambassadorship, during
which instances of ignorance about Islam and/or Muslims are countered via reasoned
argument. Fourth, we recount episodes of active resistance: a mode of facing-off conflict in
situations of direct hostility. Our primary objective is to amplify the voices of the young
people who partook in this study and to illumine the ways in which participants indexed
everyday lived experiences to identities, both individually and collectively. Whilst it may
be tempting to interpret the reflections of participants with recourse to extant frameworks,
we elect not to ‘read’ the data through a singular sociological lens. Rather, our trajectory is
oriented towards developing understandings of the cultural conditions in which young
British Muslims live and the ways in which they actively shape their lives and identities
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through embedded routinised strategies. Nonetheless, in elucidating various processes of
identity construction and maintenance adopted by participants, we highlight intersections,
resonances and divergences with classical sociocultural concepts previously developed by
Bhabha (1994); Goffman (1959), respectively.
There are further caveats to make in relation to the discussion that follows. First, it
is important to stress that the processes and practices elaborated below are not specific
to the individual. That is to say, the participants in this study cannot meaningfully be
categorised into ‘types’ nor ‘personalities’, predisposed to exhibit one or another set of
identity choices or behaviours. Rather, different responses were mobilised by participants
at different junctures, underscoring the fluid nature of identity management (see Mythen
2012; Ghorashi 2017; Pilkington and Acik 2020). Second, and following on from this,
we intend to convey the fundamentally ambivalent nature of the processes discussed for
participants. As will be expounded, both strategic adaption and resistance are largely
protective and defensive modes of identity management, whereas ambassadorship and
cherry picking offer creative opportunities for autonomous expression. These strategies and
dramaturgical displays are ‘productive’ in the broadest sense in that they simultaneously
allow the possibility of circumventing precarious interactions, countering misperceptions
and also positively affirming identity. Nonetheless, as participants’ testimonies indicate,
incessant demands to adapt and switch between modes of self-representation—allied
to underlying pressure to respond to misperceptions about faith, outlook and cultural
rituals—can also prove taxing and disruptive in specific social milieu. Before unpacking
the methodology and discussing our findings, we offer a capsule account of the broader
context in which the experiences shared by participants must be situated.
2. Setting the Context: Exclusion, Stereotyping and Islamophobia
The term Islamophobia has undergone an evolution in academia (Al-Azami 2021). It
was first defined by the Runnymede Trust as ‘dread or hatred of Islam’ and, therefore, a
‘fear or dislike of all or most Muslims’ (Runnymede Trust 1997, p. 1). The trust revisited its
position twenty years later, to conclude that Islamophobia is a complex social process akin
to a type of cultural racism (see Runnymede Trust 2017). This position also taken up by
the All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on British Muslims who note, ‘Islamophobia
is rooted in racism and is a type of racism that targets expressions of Muslimness or
perceived Muslimness’ (2018, p. 1). This paper aligns with the APPG’s definition which
was derived through extensive consultation with community and expert stakeholders, led
by a cross-party political group and endorsed across the political spectrum and multiple
sectors. Al-Azami (2021) notes, the APPG’s definition has been endorsed by two of the
three major political parties in England and all political parties in Scotland, many public
bodies and civil society organisations, numerous British academics who research Muslims
and Islam in Britain, and the largest and most influential of Muslim umbrella organisation,
the Muslim Council of Britain. Despite this growing accord, the current government is
notable in its resistance to the APPGs definition on the grounds that it would hinder free
speech and counterterrorism efforts. Regarding the latter, Martin Hewitt, chairman of the
National Police Chiefs Council and Assistant Commissioner, Neil Basu have both expressed
confidence that the APPG’s definition would not impede security efforts (Merrick 2020).
While the definition of Islamophobia is in flux, the available evidence shows Muslim
Britons suffer deep and wide-ranging concrete social disadvantages in relation to social
exclusion, violence, economic marginalisation, prejudice and discrimination (see Abbas
2019a; Allen 2020; Runnymede Trust 1997). Longstanding political and media discourses
endorsing the view that multiculturalism in Britain has ‘failed’ have frequently been in-
dexed to the idea that Muslim minority groups have struggled to integrate into British
society (see Casey 2016). Shifts in the socioeconomic landscape in Britain, including, inter
alia, financial crisis, austerity measures, Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic have created
favorable conditions for a rise in the vocality and popularity of far right-wing movements
in the UK (see Dodd 2020; Pilkington 2016; Winlow et al. 2017). While such movements
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may differ considerably in relation to their take on economic and social policies, they
are broadly united in their strident objections to Muslim minority rights (Godmin 2020).
Fueling a context of hostility for British Muslims, the current British Prime Minister, Boris
Johnson, has previously publicly articulated disparaging comments about Muslim culture
and problematised Islamic heritage, suggesting that Muslim women wearing the Burqa
resembled ‘letter-boxes’ and ‘bank robbers’ (see Allen 2020; Tell MAMA 2019). More
recently, the Prime Minister’s appointment of William Shawcross as Independent Reviewer
of the Prevent counterterrorism strategy has caused widespread consternation, given his
previous Directorship of a neoconservative thinktank and, moreover, a history of making
negative remarks about Islam (see Grierson and Dodd 2021). Within the mainstream me-
dia, the values and beliefs of British Muslims are frequently challenged and undermined.
This is allied to an ingrained process of cultural stereotyping which positions Muslims in
negative subject roles-from ‘home-grown terrorists’, to ‘jihadi brides’ and ‘foreign fighters’
(see Abbas 2019b; Khan and Mythen 2019). In addition to being ideationally under siege,
Muslims are subject to both organised and sporadic racist violence. Statistics document-
ing recorded Islamophobic attacks against Muslims are sobering. A report published
by the charity Tell MAMA (2019) recorded 1330 reports of Islamophobic abuse in 2017,
with clear spikes in frequency after the terrorist attacks in Manchester and London. The
numbers reported the preceding year—1070 recorded incidents—remain deeply troubling
(Tell MAMA 2019). While racism has historically been a persistent problem in Britain,
antagonism towards Islam and discrimination against Muslims have intensified over the
last four decades (see Abbas 2019a; Allen 2020; Kundnani 2014). As Modood (2018) posits,
the social contexts in which anti-Muslim sentiment is vectored appear to be broadening as
the prevalence of Islamophobia rises.
In the post-Second World War period, the British government encouraged migration
of Pakistani male workers to meet labour shortages in the economically declining industrial
cities of the South-East, the Midlands and the North-West (Shankley et al. 2020). British-
born and colonial-born subjects legally had equal rights under The British Nationality Act
1948. Nonetheless, Pakistani citizen-migrants, frequently faced antagonism and racism as
they settled in the UK (see McLoughlin 2010; Shankley et al. 2020). It was only arguably
during the Salman Rushdie Affair in 1989 that sections of the British Pakistani community
elected to abandon the role of silent, obedient minority and mobilised collectively as
Muslims to defend religion and honour (see McLoughlin 2010; Werbner 2004). Community
concerns that Rushdie’s retelling of the origins of Islam were provocative were represented
in the mass media as evidence of religious fanaticism (see Hussain and Bagguley 2012;
Meer et al. 2010). Public scrutiny around issues of ‘integration’ and ‘assimilation’ during
the Rushdie Affair initiated an evolution in ascribed identity, from ‘Asian’ to ‘Muslim’
for British Pakistanis. Successive national and international events and the perpetual
discursive framing of Muslims as problematic, have historically affected the way in which
Muslim identities have developed. Muslim identities, like those of other minority ethnic
groups, have long been expressed in relation to, and as resistance against, racialised
exclusionary discourses (see Dwyer 1999). Following Ahmad and Evergeti (2010), we can
identify a symbiotic process at play between the discursive imposition of ‘Muslim’ as a
master identity over Britain’s ethnically and denominationally diverse Muslim populations
and the reactive forging of ‘Muslim’ identifications as a form of agentic pride and political
mobilisation (see Abbas 2015; Modood 2005).
Although British Muslims were first systematically singled out as a problematic group
during the Rushdie Affair, the disturbances which occurred in mill towns in the North
of England in 2001 served as a watershed, after which British Muslims became widely
depicted as threatening the fabric of British society (see Kundnani 2015). While this his-
torical backdrop is important, the representation of Muslims as dangerous in the media
and popular culture has since gathered momentum (Khan and Mythen 2019; Meer and
Modood 2019). Wide-ranging research indicates that British Muslims experienced height-
ened levels of hostility and abuse in the public sphere in the years post-9/11, exacerbated
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by the terrorist attacks that followed in London and Manchester (Allen 2020; Anwar and
Hussain 2012; Mythen et al. 2009; Pilkington and Acik 2020). Anti-Muslim sentiment
has manifested in various ways, including distorted political discourses problematising
Muslims as a threat to national security (Mythen and Walklate 2015), disproportionate
forms of policing and surveillance (Nabulsi 2017) and unwarranted referral of Muslims
to Prevent counter-radicalisation panels (Qurashi 2018). These problematic institutional
policies have materialised alongside steep rises in racially motivated hate crimes (see
Burnett 2016; Casciani 2018) and widespread reporting of routine forms of harassment,
exclusion and victimisation experienced by Muslims in public spaces (Dunn and Hopkins
2016; Mythen et al. 2013). Aside from documenting specific forms of prejudice against
Muslims, there is a wealth of literature recording the pernicious and deleterious impacts
of Islamophobia (Abbas 2020; Allen 2020; Kundnani 2015). As Ansari and Hafez (2012)
note, the far-right view that Islam fundamentally conflicts with modern Western values
has recursively seeped into mainstream Conservative party-political discourse in Britain,
impacting both immigration and community cohesion policies. Politicians from across the
spectrum have voiced concerns about the failure of Muslims to embrace ‘British values’ and
controls specifically targeted to limit migration by Muslims have been enforced. Indeed,
the pervasiveness of anti-Islamic ideology and the extent to which anti-Muslim sentiments
have become normalised led Baroness Warsi (2011) to assert a decade ago that ‘Islamo-
phobia has now crossed the threshold of middle-class respectability . . . it has passed the
dinner party test’. A central ideological plank of Islamophobic discourse is the so-called
‘irreconcilability thesis’, which suggests that Islam is intrinsically opposed to Western
ideals (Huntingdon 1997). Such injudicious views fuel anti-Islamic discourses, creating an
unsettling environment for young Muslims in which maintaining a settled sense of identity
can be challenging (see Mythen 2012; McDonald 2019). The presentation of British Muslims
in media and popular culture as ‘risky’ and an ‘enemy within’ has reinforced negative
cultural stereotypes held by those antagonistic towards Muslims. Discourses perpetuated
in popular right-wing media outlets that British Muslims are especially prone to radicalisa-
tion has served only to escalate tensions. Through the operationalisation of a panoply of
surveillant practices-coupled to dominant media and political discourses-British Muslims
have become ‘securitised’ over the last two decades (see Hussain and Bagguley 2012;
Qurashi 2018). As our data illustrate, it is misleading to suggest that this securitised context
is all encompassing in shaping the experiences of young British Muslims. Nevertheless, a
general climate of suspicion directed towards Muslims engenders distinct challenges and,
as we shall elaborate, renders intensive identity management techniques necessitous.
3. Methods
The qualitative study reported on below was designed to gather insights into identity
construction and management amongst a group of young British Pakistani Muslims, aged
between 18 and 26. The first phase of data collection involved thirty-two participants
contributing to four focus groups, each with equal gender representation. Open questions—
intended to encourage participants to reflect on their experiences—were formulated to serve
as a compass for focus group discussion. The second phase comprised twelve in-depth
interviews, selected from the participant pool and again gender balanced. Participants
were recruited initially through contacts and gatekeepers within the Muslim community
and, thereafter, through snowball sampling. Focus groups were used to capture interactive
discussions to gather knowledge of attitudes, beliefs, practices, life events and collective
identity narratives. Focus groups served to highlight group norms and processes and
to illuminate the social, cultural and institutional contexts in which individual agency
takes place. Intra-group dialogue generated in a supportive focus group environment can
provide multiple layers of meaning, including convergence and divergence in attitudes
and behaviour that may remain untapped during solitary interactions with researchers
(see Litosseliti 2003; Morgan 1997). Methodological utility aside, focus groups enable
exploration of the life-worlds of socially marginalised groups, particularly in circumstances
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in which participants are able to share their experiences of ‘concrete’ situations (Morgan
1997). Intensive group dialogue can itself be transformational, raising consciousness of
power relationships and allowing supportive sharing of the impacts of inequality (Johnson
1996). In our view, the deep discussions that arose during focus groups signalled that
participants were keen to share a platform to express their experiences and viewpoints.
The second semi-structured interview phase permitted further exploration of issues raised
in the focus groups, with individual accounts of social experiences being further excavated
(see King and Horrocks 2010). Semi-structured interviews were deployed to elicit ‘thick
description’ of identity management techniques, enabling contextual detail and specificity
(see Geertz 1973). All focus groups and interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim
and participants were attributed pseudonyms to ensure anonymity. The principles of
grounded theory were followed during the research process in order to approach the
data from the ‘bottom up’ (see Strauss and Corbin 1990). Grounded theory facilitates
methodical gathering of information from participants and enables dynamic data analysis
(see Ralph et al. 2015). Rather than adhering to a pre-determined theoretical framework, it
was our intention to design this study in an open fashion to facilitate novel and creative
conceptual development. In line with grounded theory, axial encoding was conducted
after the first and second phases of research, permitting iterative analysis and cross-referral.
Initial codes were attached to the raw data using Nvivo qualitative research software
and were subsequently clustered together into broader categories to identify recurrent
patterns. Following consistency cross-checks between the researchers, a definitive set of
processes of identity construction and management were derived. While non-generalisable,
these processes do represent embedded patterns of behaviour articulated and shared by
participants.
The community’s major growth, however, dates from the post-Second World War
immigration of Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, and Indians to fill specific labour demands in
declining industrial cities in the South-East, the Midlands, and the North.
4. Discussion
4.1. Identities in Motion: Cultivation, Negotiation and Resistance
Celebrating Hybridity: Cherry Picking
We begin our analysis by unpacking arguably the most affirmative process of identity
building, which we have dubbed ‘cherry picking’. During focus groups and interviews,
participants spoke enthusiastically about being able to actively adopt and blend practices
and products from their familial cultures of origin. Not only were the benefits of being
able to access facets of British/Pakistani traditions highlighted—for example, in terms
of fashion, music, film and cuisine—participants also described the way in which this
enabled them to assume a unique cultural vantage point. Having a privileged entrée
to two heritages—considered in part distinct, but correspondingly rich—was a common
topic of discussion. Whilst globalisation and Muslim diaspora renders the drawing of
distinctions between ‘Islamic’ and ‘Western’ traditions somewhat outmoded, our partici-
pants nonetheless commonly chose to frame their cultural choices and experiences through
contrasting facets of their dual-heritage identities. Disputing the specious claims associ-
ated with Huntingdon’s (1997) much maligned irreconcilability thesis, the experiences
and perspectives of our participants illustrate that claims regarding incompatibility are
erroneous. Highlighting the progressive possibilities of being able to draw across cultures,
our participants articulated an ‘and’ rather than an ‘either/or’ approach to their identity
choices, as the following exchanges demonstrate:
Hanna: ‘I think you can still be a good Muslim and appreciate the benefits of living in
Britain. You can appreciate both cultures. Like you can wear Western style clothes, but still
wear the hijab. Living here you get the best of both worlds’.
Hanna’s views are consistent with the findings of cognate studies involving young
British-born Muslims (see Zempi 2016; Werbner 2011). Veiling is asserted by Hanna as
an identity choice, rather than an immutable practice. In signalling personal devotion to
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Islam and pride in a dual-heritage identity, Hanna sees no contradiction in being Muslim
and British. Her reference to the ‘best of both world’s’ chimes with Homi Bhabha’s (1994)
third space thesis, with progressive aspects of cultural intermingling being accented. The
positive possibilities of cultural fusion identified by Hanna were also reinforced by Yasmin:
Yasmin: ‘I’ve got to say I love our clothes, and all the Western stuff as well. I mean, I
wouldn’t want to live the rest of my life wearing one or the other . . . you can wake up and
go to college channelling Gigi Hadid, but when I get married it’ll be full on Mughal bride
with lengha, jewellery, embroidery, mehndi. No white dress for me’.
Echoing Hanna’s view, Yasmin’s response typifies appreciation of the immediacy
of access to an array of sartorial choices, selected to cultivate hybridised British Muslim
identities. In a similar vein, Homi Bhabha (1994) discusses the progressive potential of
assuming ‘in-between’ or ‘interstitial’ identities which enable individuals to flit between
subject positions and cultures, facilitating a ‘third way’ of seeing, representing and knowing.
Extending Hanna and Yasmin’s observations, Aroos describes the liberating aspects of
cultural mixity and personal choice:
Aroos: ‘We’ve got access to literally everything. For our generation, it’s literally
win-win. If you want Muslim modesty wear, seriously, get it next-day delivery from ASOS
or nip to the high-street and get a tunic-trouser co-ord and you’re ready to pray, whatever.
Honestly, I got all my Umrah clothes from normal shops. You don’t have to go to the
material shop, go for a fitting and get it sewn up like our mums. None of that faff. But if
you want to rock a boiler suit and get shisha down the strip [local milieu] no-one will bat
an eyelid. Actually, they’ll be there doing it with you (laughs) . . . nobody cares anymore,
you can just do what you want, have a bit of everything’.
While these findings are consistent with previous studies of Muslim youth (see Abbas
2015; Herding 2014; Mir 2011), they diverge from conceptions of hybridity that locate
culture as the defining element of identity. Aroos’ narrative aligns with Anthias’ concept of
‘translocational positionality’ (Anthias 2001, p. 619), a critique of ‘old ethnicities’ that centre
culture in the narration of identity and ‘otherness,’ at the expense of a range of intersecting
issues related to hybridity. While Anthias’ framework relies on an intersectional perspec-
tive, it rejects static group categories that intersect, instead offering identity positions as
locations that are contextually contingent, allowing the possibility of conflict, contradic-
tions and fluidity between subject positions. Aroos’ account aligns with these principles.
While access to the array of fashion choices she describes is rooted in the cultural third
space, those choices express a range of intersecting positions including gender, religion
and modes of consumption. In this way, the texture and range of Aroos’ British Muslim
identity cannot be fully understood from within cultural and religious boundaries alone.
Torrekens et al. (2021) demonstrated strongly identifying as Muslim is not experienced as
exclusive of other identifications claimed simultaneously and this phenomenon that has
long been documented in the literature. Abu-Lughod (2002) identified merging practices
amongst Islamic, Christian and Jewish religious communities, who engage in integration
of holy texts and traditions with modern practices and ideals. More recently, Janmohamed
(2016, p. 3) coined ‘generation M’ to encapsulates how young Muslims uphold religious
traditions while asserting multi-vocal identities and contemporary lifestyle choices.
4.2. Adjusting to Context: Strategic Adaption
While opportunities to ‘cherry pick’ were roundly valued by participants and illus-
trate the benefits of cultural diversity, strategic adaption describes a more ambivalent
mode of identity management, encapsulating techniques of public presentation primarily
designed to maintain equilibrium and minimise conflict. These practices elicit parallels
with Bhabha’s notion of ‘mimicry’ (Bhabha 1994, p. 125), through which individuals adopt
mirroring strategies to ‘fit in’. While mimicry is grounded by power relations, it nonetheless
constitutes a transformatory act, whereby the ‘other’ is a point of difference that is ‘almost
the same, but not quite’ (Bhabha 1994, p. 126). In this way, mimicry involves a ‘double
articulation’, through which the other is appropriated for power as (s)he visualises it (see
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Rutherford 1990). Despite the potential similarities, there are also differences to be noted be-
tween the concepts of strategic adaption and mimicry. Whilst the latter can be understood
as an act of simultaneous mirroring and transformation, the former constitutes a more cal-
culated mode of social positioning. Through strategic adaption, an individual may decide
to actively blend in through speech or behaviour; they may deploy a considered silence,
or indeed consciously omit certain facts or beliefs in order to avoid potential distress and
disequilibrium arising from discrepancies between social context and performed identity
(Marcussen 2006). Our data illumine various ways in which participants employed such
methods, not so much as a form of mimicry, but more as a projected performance of being
the ‘same’ as non-Muslims, consciously deflecting attention from what may otherwise
be perceived as ‘differences’. For our participants, strategic adaption took two primary
forms: first, that facilitating transitions between different social situations and, second, as a
technique of conflict avoidance. These forms underline the fluidity of identities and are
indicative of shifting identity performances that align with intersecting subject positions
(see Anthias 2001; Eisen 2019; Hamid 2018; Mir 2011). Inviting further comparison with
Goffman’s (1959) symbolic interactionism, participants described a process of presenting
different ‘faces’ to align with cultural context. Strategic adaption thus incorporates dra-
maturgical behaviours that involve modifying actions to suit the environment, such as
making selective sartorial and language choices according to place. In discussions around
identity, embodiment and identification of Islam in speech and action were frequently
alluded to. Here, Maryam describes adopting adaptive tactics to enhance ‘Muslimness’ in
the domestic sphere and ‘non-Muslimness’ in the public sphere:
Maryam: ‘It’s like when I was younger. I’d be out with all my friends, English friends
as well, and you’d be having a laugh all the time-meeting boys, going to clubs-and then
you’d go home and be a completely different person. You’d play the dutiful daughter, all
demure and proper, and your parents wouldn’t have a clue about what you were getting
up to! To be honest, it’s still a bit like that [laughs]. There are still things we don’t talk
about, even now’.
Maryam’s comments suggest that she does not consider aspects of her identity as
necessarily correspondent, but nor are they perceived as jarring. To run with Goffman’s
metaphor, Maryam chooses the ‘mask’ (Goffman 1959, p. 19) deemed to be most appropri-
ate to fit the situation. As Bullingham and Vasconcelos (2013, p. 101) note, individuals are
able to ‘bring forth certain aspects of the self in interaction while simultaneously marginal-
ising others. The individual is not becoming somebody else when s/he does this, but rather
both the mask worn and the person behind it are facets of the same individual’. Mask
wearing is crucial for individuals managing complex hybridised identities. Attempting
to meticulously reconcile multiple facets of identity may result in a fractured sense of self
and destabilisation of ontological security. Thus, in certain cultural contexts, participants
described a process of acceding to what Mir (2007, p. 81) describes as ‘majority practices’.
Like Maryam, several female participants reported experiencing sartorial expectations
regarding the wearing of traditional dress. To illustrate the importance of switching ‘masks’
in sustaining a coherent identity, we can consider Zaineb’s use of the hijab to (de)emphasize
her Muslim identity. While her parents believe wearing the hijab is a core Islamic require-
ment, for Zaineb this was incongruent with her lifestyle and cultural interactions. To
maintain both ‘faces’, Zaineb has created what might describe as portable Islam, typified
by carrying the hijab in her handbag, to don or remove as context dictates. Wearing the
veil for Zaineb is thus a flexible rather than a fixed part of her British Muslim identity.
Zaineb: ‘It’s like wearing the hijab. No one really forces me to. I just do it to please my
parents really. Don’t get me wrong, I love wearing it sometimes, like at weddings, or at
Eid, but I don’t want to wear it all the time. Loads of girls I know hardly ever wear it, but
my parents think it’s disrespectful. So, I just end up taking it off when I’m at college or out
with friends and putting it back on before I get near home’.
Vectoring adaptive qualities, many participants reported selecting the most appropri-
ate ‘face’ or ‘mask’ for the setting, changing aspects of their language, clothes or behaviour
Soc. Sci. 2021, 10, 449 8 of 16
to project a preferred image. In Goffman’s (1959, p. 23) terms, this might constitute select-
ing the right ‘props’ to achieve the desired outcomes of self-presentation. The intricate
processes of self-evaluation and identity negotiation recounted by our participants were
pre-dominantly self-affirming. Nevertheless, while managing a malleable identity may be
partly enabling, it requires constant effort, energy and foresight. Simply celebrating the cre-
ative aspects of hybridised identities amongst our participants would be myopic and elides
the emotional impacts of spatial and temporal ‘face changes’. Whereas the experiences of
female participants illuminate how gender intersects with the specific challenges of being
British and Muslim, ubiquitous discomfort emerged around the public besmirching of
Islam, as Yasmin and Muhammad-Ali illustrate:
Yasmin: ‘I’m always finding myself in those positions. You know, where someone’s
saying something against Muslims or putting down Islam. Half the time they’ve not even
registered I’m Muslim. Even though you totally disagree with them you just stay quiet.
Or you change the subject because you can’t be bothered getting into another argument.
Otherwise they just think you’re a fundamentalist nutter and try everything they can to
avoid you’.
Muhammad-Ali: ‘Like this shop I used to work in, the manager was a right idiot.
Always questioning me about being Muslim, always making really stupid comments.
She’d try to get me to talk about it. Anyway, one day these two Muslim girls came in,
one of them wearing a hijab, and she said to me after they’d left: “what are they doing
shopping here?” and started slagging them off for coming in. I couldn’t believe she said it,
to me, a Muslim! What could I do, though? She was my manager. So I just had to shut it
out and try to ignore what she was saying. Thing was, I didn’t want her thinking I was
agreeing with her’.
In these reflections, Yasmin and Muhammad-Ali articulate some of the dilemmas
that emerge as a consequence of adopting practices of strategic adaption to avert the
non-Muslim, racialised gaze. They are illustrative of situations in which fundamental
ideological beliefs are subdued to avoid tension and conflict. Yasmin avoids being drawn
into expressing her personal beliefs for fear of being labelled an extremist. Although
Muhammad-Ali is enraged by the Islamophobic comments of his manager, in order to
prevent escalation and potential damage to his career, he employs a considered silence.
Whilst understandable, such forms of conflict minimisation and deflection are not bereft
of psychological and ontological consequences. To this end, participants spoke of the
unsettling nature of compromising or ‘hiding’ their beliefs, of not ‘being themselves’ and
feeling compelled ‘to walk away’. By opting to self-censor rather than directly oppose
the misguided views of others, disruption can be avoided in public, but not without
triggering internal disquiet. Practices of strategic adaption may serve as protective factors,
yet avoiding external conflict can propagate internal feelings of frustration:
Khadija: ‘We all do it. You feel so angry at what people are saying sometimes, but
you know you can’t really say what you want to say. You just have to keep it inside, when
really all you want to do is scream at them. But I don’t. And then I feel like a loser. Like I
had a small opportunity to defend Islam and I let someone trample on it. Then I’m angry
with myself and angry with them for putting me in that position’.
Aisha: ‘I just get so angry sometimes. I can’t talk to some people. They do your head
in. I just have to walk away because if I stay, if I start talking to them, I’ll just go OTT on
them. I mean it man, I’ll freak out on them. And you can’t do that all the time like a psycho
hijabi. They’ll put me in an asylum. Last time that happened was when Emily said the
Middle East needed saving by America and isn’t it good that we have the American police
to keep everyone in order. Oh my God, I just couldn’t hold it in. I lost the plot. I haven’t
seen Emily again. I think she was shocked. I think I took all my frustration out on her. She
thinks I’m the devil now’.
Again chiming with Goffman’s (1959) symbolic interactionism, participants discussed
various identity management strategies used to resist labelling and reject stigma. Never-
theless, being directly exposed to prejudice was understandably hurtful for participants,
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provoking ‘fight or flight’ decisions. Both Khadija and Aisha explain how being forced
to repress important values and beliefs-in Mir’s (2011, p. 554) terms, ‘half-disavowal of
identity’-can lead to self-recrimination. The exchange above echoes cognate studies (see
Mythen 2012; Khan and Mythen 2019; Lems 2021; Shams 2020) and illustrates both the
complexities and the accumulative cost of maintaining public equilibrium at the expense
of muting cherished facets of culture, faith and identity. External pressure to perform a role
that will be acceptable to the majority can be exasperating, as Zahra reflects:
Zahra: ‘I was reading this article, about a Muslim guy. He made a really interesting
point. He said he has to keep what he thinks about things like Palestine and Syria a secret
because of what people might think. But when anything like the London attacks happen
you’re supposed to make a public show of how devastated you are. It’s like you have to
prove yourself all the time. How can one of those things be worse than the other?’
Zahra’s comment is telling in relation to our earlier discussion of muting, in that it
underscores some of the personal consequences of ‘keeping secret’ opinions and beliefs that
may be perceived as politically provocative. Echoing cognate studies, several participants
expressed the view that what they deemed as legitimate political views-for instance,
opposition against Israeli State violence in Palestine-had to be suppressed in public, due to
concerns about being seen as an extremist (see Awan and Zempi 2018; Shams 2020).
While the vignettes above reveal some of the pernicious micro-level impacts of Islam-
ophobia, it is important to keep a grip on what they represent at a macro-structural level.
Not only are these experiences located in ‘contested spaces of identity’ (Ajrouch 2004) at a
deeper strata they reveal the wider implications and consequences of everyday systemic
forms of racism (see Pérez 2017).
4.3. Imparting Islam: Ambassadorship
In as much as cherry picking and strategic adaption enable opportunities for choice
and reflexive decision making, the final two processes to be excavated—ambassadorship
and active resistance—correspond with the cultural climate of Islamophobia in Britain and
the processes of securitisation to which young Muslims in particular have been subjected
to during their formative socialisation (see Mythen et al. 2013; Dunn and Hopkins 2016). In
contrast to strategic adaption, a third approach to managing challenges in the public sphere
discussed by participants was that of ‘ambassadorship’. This refers to circumstances in
which—rather than deflecting conflict—individuals felt compelled to attempt to educate
strangers, acquaintances and work colleagues. It has been observed that the predominantly
prescribed role for Muslims in the West post-9/11 was to act as ever-ready apologists
for terrorism (Van Es 2019). Following attacks conducted by individuals sympathetic to
radical Islamist philosophy across Europe and rising levels of hate crime, there is little to
suggest significant improvements in overall attitudes towards Muslims since this time (see
Awan and Zempi 2018; Allen 2020; Burnett 2016). Muslims in Britain remain negatively
represented in the public sphere in relation to issues of faith, culture and national security
(Meer and Modood 2019). In response to being positioned defensively, some participants
in this study talked about how they actively sought to inform others about Islam. The
pressure to challenge inaccurate accounts of Islam was most acutely felt in relation to the
problem of terrorism, with several participants discussing circumstances in which they felt
compelled to engage with non-Muslims to contest false accounts of their faith. In response
to misrepresentations of Islam as an inherently violent religion, several participants cited
instances in which they had felt duty bound to educate non-Muslims about their core
values and principles. Often these instances in which Islam was ideationally attacked were
connected to the implication that Muslims were ‘less British’ than non-Muslim Britons. In
addition to rejecting the cultural construction of Muslims as ‘enemies within’, participants
expressed irritation at demands to prove their ‘Britishness’ on demand by being subjected
to various ‘tests’. One frequently cited test was being challenged to condemn terrorist
attacks conducted by individuals purporting to be motivated by radical Islam:
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Hafsa: ‘It’s like when they uncover a terrorist plot or something, you feel you have
to put on some sort of public display to show how shocked you are . . . make sure people
understand that sort of indiscriminate killing is against Islam. It’s almost like you have
to apologise and express more shock because you’re Muslim. I remember someone once
asked me if I thought killing all those people on 9/11 was okay. I mean they really thought
there was a possibility that I would say: “Yes. I think it was okay when they killed 2000
innocent people”’.
In a similar vein, Syed reveals how, as a British Muslim, he has been put under
pressure to vocally condemn anti-Western terrorism in public circles:
Syed: ‘It’s as if you’re somehow guilty if you don’t show how outraged you are. You
have to show that you’re more upset than they are after every attack. Mourn like it was
someone from your own family who was killed. If you don’t, they’ll tar you with the same
brush. I mean, why should we? They don’t give a damn about Muslims being killed, do
they?’
Syed articulates his frustration at being associated with historical acts of violent
extremism simply by virtue of his religious affiliation. In refusing to overtly and publicly
condemn terrorist acts on demand, Syed fears being seen as a terrorist sympathiser. Aside
from feeling interrogated about their views regarding acts of terrorism, our participants
discussed the challenges of maintaining a strong sense of religious identity in conditions
in which Islam is routinely undermined by non-Muslims (see Abbas 2019a; Kundnani
2015; Nabulsi 2017). Against this broader backdrop, Syed offered a personal account of his
feelings of being held to account in school:
Syed: ‘You know you are different right from being young. Having to explain things
about you to other people. As soon as I got to school it started. You know, like “why do
you wear them clothes? Why can’t you sit in assemblies?” It’s like Ramzaan [Ramadan].
At home it was just something normal that everybody you knew did. Something special
you really looked forward to. Then suddenly you have to explain yourself. Your friends
asking stupid questions like: “Why do you have to do it? What do mean you can’t eat?
Why can’t you drink?” They try to make it sound a bit pointless, almost stupid, so it just
spoils it for you’.
Syed’s experiences show how young British Muslims are exposed to routine challenges
of their religious beliefs, traditions and practices from an early age, fixed in a position
of justification and explanation. Other participants recognised the implications of being
questioned about Islam but accepted it as their Islamic duty to explain the principles of
Islam. For Aisha, maturation as an adult was important in making the decision to adopt
a more proactive approach towards educating others about the values of Islam, even in
challenging situations:
Aisha: ‘Yeah, it’s changed, definitely. It’s like the older I get, the more I’ve felt I should
show people what’s good about Islam, show people what Muslims are really like; that the
negative way we’re made out to be just isn’t true. It’s like you have to defend yourself,
even when you haven’t even done or said anything. It does my head in, because I feel like
I’m constantly in the dock. But you’ve got to look at the bigger picture and try to defend
Islam’.
Both positionality and the gaze of others influences notions of self and collective
identity. Picking up on Aisha’s thread, Hanna also talked about the demands of adopting a
hands-on approach to enlightening others:
Hanna: ‘I sometimes feel that I have to go out of my way to defend Islam, even to
some of my white friends who I know pretty well. It’s like having to prove yourself to
people all the time that you’re not some secret religious fanatic. I just do it. I think as
Muslims it’s really hard, but it’s my religion, my family’s religion and it is being hijacked
by people who don’t really understand it’.
As these testimonies indicate, in particular cultural contexts, young British Muslims
may feel positioned in such a way as to feel duty bound to act as ambassadors for Islam.
While on certain occasions, strategic adaption may be an appropriate response, at other
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times the need to correct and inform supersedes. Hafsa, Aisha and Hanna all acknowledge
the entrenched nature of Islamophobia underlying the interactions they describe. Yet,
they nonetheless make a conscious decision to defend Islam and correct misperceptions
of their faith. Despite being party to verbal abuse and discrimination, most participants
remained positive about defending Islam when required, suggesting a commitment to
advancing micro-level cultural change. Nevertheless, others felt aggrieved by the burden
of societal demands to perform the role of the peaceful, benign Muslim. In many respects,
Bhabha (1994) encapsulates these sentiments in his ‘third space enunciation’, exploring the
potentialities of an ideational zone in which identities are subject to question and dialogue
proselytises the working through of contradictions and ambivalences. Understood in
this way, ambassadorship might be conceived as a form of enunciation that challenges
binary constructions, underscoring the possibilities of plural expressions of Muslim identity.
While this strikes a sanguine chord, it is important to avoid naivety about the corrective
capacity of ambassadorship. Whilst some participants felt that their attempts to educate
had produced lasting effects in terms of individual value changes, it remains the case that
forms of stigma are institutionally embedded, wedded to processes of labelling and rooted
in power relations.
4.4. Challenging Islamophobia: Active Resistance
The final strand of identity management discussed here pertains to situations of
conflict in which strategic adaption and/or ambassadorship were deemed unfeasible.
Participants described various circumstances where conflict avoidance or reasoned debate
was not appropriate or sufficient. When directly confronted with racist abuse, conflict was
deemed to be inevitable, causing resentment and personal disquiet. While participants
certainly felt ‘at home’ in Britain, they recounted many examples of occasions when some
Britons were not at home with them. As others have noted, young British Muslims must
not only combine, but also reconcile national, transnational and religious elements of their
identities (see Khan and Mythen 2019; Shams 2020). As the narratives above testify, this
reconciliation can partially be achieved through the deployment of strategic adaption
or ambassadorship. However, such behavioural modes and ways of responding have
less purchase in volatile situations where the Muslim self is directly threatened. In this
regard, our findings partially echo Mir’s (2011) observations of young American Muslim
women who deploy ‘loud identities’. Such identities are vocally Muslim, shunning the
self-preservation techniques of strategic adaption and instead demanding the right to
be respected. Participants in Mir’s study were aware that in asserting their right to be
conspicuously Muslim, they would have to face the stigma associated with the racialised
and stigmatised “other” and the situational precariousness that may ensue. Of significance
here is the situating and positioning capacity of the white gaze. As Smith et al. (2020, p. 4)
posit: ‘the white gaze entails not just a reading of a social object but also a rendering of
that object; its authority is enacted precisely in the moment of perception, as the racialized
body is made vulnerable to (its) scrutiny’. To this end, our participants recounted negative
encounters in which punctures to their sense of ‘Britishness’ had occurred. Discussions
regarding such punctures centred on two issues: objections to military interventions in
Muslim countries and overt hostility experienced as a result of being Muslim. As other
studies have reported, oppression of Muslims domestically and abroad, coupled with
instances of institutional discrimination and a climate of Islamophobia have served to
solidify Islamic aspects of identity for some British Muslims (see Mythen 2012; Jacobson
1997; Hamid 2018). Yet, the (re) assertion of Islamic pride for young British Muslims can
also be tinged with anger and intermingles with internal ontological dynamics:
Syed: ‘Well, I don’t think about it normally. I never think, “Oh! I’m Asian.” You know,
someone says something, and there it is. Racism. It can happen anywhere, funny looks on
the train, wondering why you didn’t get that job, my sister telling me someone laughed at
her, or she thinks they did. It gets you paranoid. You know that’s it, if someone sniggers at
my sister’s hijab, it is past the point of explaining to them, it’s time to get it on’.
Soc. Sci. 2021, 10, 449 12 of 16
In a divergent context, Muhammad-Ali also articulated similar sentiments of ire, in
this instance pertaining to previous British military action in the Middle East:
Muhammad-Ali: ‘The thing that totally does it for me is when they start bombing
Muslim countries. Seriously, how many dead Muslim kids do they have to see before
people say no! I mean for fuck’s sake, it gets me so down, so angry. I can’t think about it
too much. That’s the kind of thing that makes it really hard living here. You don’t want to
have anything to do with it, but you can’t get away from Britain’s role in it all. You can’t. I
don’t want that sort of shit being done in my name. I don’t want to be British in a way that
means I sleep easy when they’re bombing kids’.
Here, Muhammad-Ali discusses the complexities and conflicts of negotiating na-
tional and transnational elements of his identity, of being British Muslim while retaining
global Muslim solidarities. His account, along with Zahra’s insights about muting around
Muslim global politics discussed in the previous section, echo a broader theme in the
data. Participants understood their experiences as Muslims in the UK in relation to the
oppression of Muslims globally, but were simultaneously acutely aware that conspicuous
support for those groups exposes them as the Muslim ‘other.’ In this way, our findings
support earlier studies (see Awan and Zempi 2018; Mir 2011). Of relevance is Shams’ (2020)
study which elucidates the transnational nature and reach of precariousness for Muslims.
Based on ethnographic observation of young Californian Muslims, Shams asserts that
the precariousness of one oppressed Muslim group subsumes national, ethnic and social
borders to function as an additional layer of social insecurity for Muslims in America. Such
transnational precariousness operates through discursive censorship and discrediting of
Muslim political concerns and of those individuals who vocalise them. This exposure to
precarity is articulated in the reflections of Muhammad-Ali above. He is clearly aware that
protesting against British military oppression in Muslim countries outwardly destabilises
his perceived ‘Britishness’, but challenges such a construction of national belonging, ‘I
don’t want to be British in a way that means I sleep easy when they’re bombing kids’. The
transnational precarity resulting from the stigma of expressing global Muslim solidarities
is particularly salient at this particular historical juncture in relation to the surge in conflict
in Palestine and opposition to the military bombardment of Gaza by the Israeli State. While
freedom of expression and the right to protest are enshrined in law in the UK under the
Human Rights Act (1998), reports have surfaced indicating that young Muslims’ expressing
Palestinian solidarity have been silenced in schools and berated for being antisemitic, in
some cases leading to disciplinary action (Parveen 2021; Prevent Watch 2021).
The micro- and macro-level examples raised by Muhammad-Ali and Syed drill deep
into the stultifying nature of ‘Britishness’ tests alluded to earlier. The more Syed and
Muhammad-Ali are exposed to experiences that fundamentally contradict their subject
positions as British Muslims, the more they are forced to question their sense of national
belonging and the seemingly incomplete nature of their citizenship rights. As Syed sug-
gests, certain interactions regarding the boundaries between ‘Britishness’ and ‘Muslimness’
are beyond the parameters of reasoned debate and shift him into the territory of direct
conflict. These experiences are illustrative of the power dynamics of the third space which
is not always made up of ‘equal parts’, nor necessarily productive of harmonious relations
(see Rutherford 1990). Rather, it is a space saturated by traces of historical power relations,
where racism in Syed’s case and military violence in Muhammad-Ali’s case are considered
beyond the pale. Processes of oppositional resistance indicate a fortified sense of identity
and a deeper understanding of Islam amongst some younger Muslims, emerging partly as
a response to intense questioning of their faith and culture by non-Muslims. While stigma
functions as a form of structurally embedded power, the narratives and reflections of par-
ticipants in this study indicate that collective mobilisation of forms of identity management
can serve as a protective shield to resist being defined as ‘other’. As practices of active
resistance suggest, under certain conditions prejudice can be ideationally eschewed and
collective identity fortified.
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5. Conclusions
Our data illustrate some of the complexities of identity management as articulated
by a group of young British Pakistani Muslims. As their reflections indicate, maintaining
identity in liminal spaces involves negotiating borders and boundaries, reflexively exacting
identity choices and flexibly adapting presentation of the self. As the experiential vignettes
above show, the racialised production of space and place connects not only to ‘allowable’
expressions of identity, but, moreover, processes of belonging and exclusion. While macro-
level theoretical sociological debates around the nature and meaning of racism progress
(see Doane 2017; Shiao and Woody 2021) in this article we have sought to shine a light
on specific micro-level effects on a particular group of young British Muslims. We have
prioritised four prevalent processes of identity management recounted by participants, em-
phasising the mutable nature of these processes and the mixed fruits they yield. Indubitably,
the cultural, social and political climate in the UK over the last two decades has impacted
markedly on practices of identity building in general. We have argued here that the pecu-
liarities and specificities of this context for young British Pakistani Muslims—including an
entrenched climate of suspicion, securitisation and surveillance—have facilitated distinct
and distinctive responses. These responses are inherently ambivalent, invoking modes
of challenging Islamophobia and creating opportunities for the cultivation of hybridic
identities (see also Mythen 2012; Herding 2014). Aside from the personal ramifications for
our participants and their peers, our findings bring to the surface policy dilemmas. The
abundant examples of hostility and abuse experienced by participants are disturbing and
serve to underline the deep-seated nature of Islamophobia in Britain. Insofar as the findings
related here may play a small role in influencing the contemporary intellectual agenda
around Muslim identities, it is of paramount importance that institutional policies and
practices are not only scrutinised, but, moreover, transformed in order to counter systemic
racism and discrimination. The young people we spoke to had been subjected to episodes
of discomfort across various social contexts in which they had been personally abused
and/or in which their faith, culture and heritage had been besmirched. Given such a
hostile climate, the ingenuity and resilience described in the narratives of participants is all
the more remarkable. While institutional racism, misguided State policies and discourses
which problematise Muslims must continue to be challenged, by dint of collective resource-
fulness and personal durability, the young British Pakistani Muslims we spoke with had
managed to positively construct and recursively recreate their identities. By valorising
their cultural heritage and celebrating faith commitments, participants had developed
semi-protective shields to deflect stigma and ward off some of the most egregious aspects
of Islamophobia. As Modood (2018, p. 3) avers: ‘by definition “othering” sees a minority
in terms of how a dominant group negatively and stereotypically imagines that minority
as something “other”, as inferior or threatening, and to be excluded.’ While dominant
groups typically project their own fears and anxieties on to the minority, minorities, are
never merely “projections” of dominant groups. Rather, as our data suggest, individual
subjectivity and collective agency act as vehicles through which misperceptions can be
challenged, exclusionary stereotypes rejected, and prideful identities asserted. Echoing
Modood’s observations, for participants in this study, episodes of discrimination and abuse
were critical in the development of a palette of strategic responses. Far from being rendered
powerless by forms of exclusion, agency was multiply mobilised to express a positive sense
of ‘Muslimness’ from below and a firm attachment to dual-heritage identities. While much
has historically been made in mainstream politics and the media of the supposed irreconcil-
ability of British and Islamic identities, this supposition is roundly debunked by our data.
Rather than feeling coerced into presenting as either ‘British’ or ‘Muslim’, our participants,
expressed a strong commitment to hybridic identities, modifying accents according to con-
text. In toto, this study endorses the view that identities are expressive of translocational
subject positions, always in motion and perpetually reproducing mixity (Ghorashi 2017).
For participants, the capacity to cross-culturally cherry pick was nourishing to the self
and considered to be a valuable privilege. Conversely, the navigation of identities in the
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third space is a process characterised by tension and struggle. Metaphorically inhabiting
the third space must be distinguished from benignly perceiving it as a site at which the
deep-rooted power structures of the past are dismantled to make space for culturally
inclusive norms. The third space is not a free-floating zone untouched by meta-societal
hegemonies. Rather, it arises from and is subject to the power configurations of society
and bound by socially prescribed norms. Identities and emotions are ineluctably situated
within discrete arrangements of power. Both strategic adaption and ambassadorship serve
as manifestations of this. The examples of active resistance discussed demonstrate the
potentially solidifying character of identities maintained under challenge. As we have
argued, it is not so much despite, but moreover because of, the hostile climate faced by
young British Muslims in contemporary Britain that the modes of identity management
illuminated above have emerged and crystallised.
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